Imagine winning one of the greatest victories in history only for journalists and academics to portray it as a blunder-filled near-disaster.
That's the story of Leyte Gulf. In the historiography of WWII the debate over command decisions and "missed" opportunities has obscured the fact that the US Navy won a victory without precedent in modern naval warfare. The writerly urge to heighten the drama in a narrative often obscures the fact that Japan's operation SHO was nothing more than gruesome theatrical flourish. The Imperial Japanese Navy would go down to "honourable" destruction for no strategic purpose. Their admirals knew that the sacrifice had no chance to alter the outcome of the Philippines campaign let alone the Pacific War. Yet they ordered thousands of men to their deaths for a grand gesture.
Mark Stille, in a recent book on the battle does a great job setting the record straight.
Leyte Gulf, in his view, "was the greatest American naval victory of the war". He has the facts to back up his assertion. Japan lost 45% (by tonnage) of the forces it committed to this battle. Those losses were eight times greater than those suffered by the US Navy. The IJN ceased to exist as a significant military force.
Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World's Largest Sea Battle
Stille makes three key points which are often overlooked in popular narratives.
1. Air supremacy was vital.
The surface actions around Leyte Gulf were almost a side show. The only real threat to the Leyte campaign was Japanese airpower With that in mind, Adm. Halsey and the Third Fleet struck air bases in Okinawa Formosa, and Luzon in the two weeks before the landings. Japan lost more planes in those battles than Germany lost in the entire Battle of Britain. After that drubbing Japanese naval forces were helpless against air attacks. "It would not be an exaggeration to state that the outcome of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, fought only a week later, was already a foregone conclusion."
2. The escort carriers were far from helpless.
Aircraft from the CVE's flew over 400 sorties against Kurita's battleships and cruisers. This was more than the big carriers of Task Force 38 had thrown against the same Japanese force the previous day when it sank the superbattleship Musashi. Together with their destroyers and destroyer escorts the baby flattops sank 3 heavy cruisers and damaged several other warships.
The battle of Samar was much more than a lopsided fight between Sprague's escort carriers and light escorts and the heavy ships of the First Diversionary Attack Force. As the surface ships battled, there was also an air-sea battle unfolding. The scale of American air attacks on Kurita's ships from 730 until about 930 by over 200 aircraft was one of the heaviest onslaughts of the entire war. Unrelenting American air attacks were the main reason for the Japanese defeat.
Kurita's decision to retire is completely understandable in light of these loses. His depleted task force was being whittled down while the slow pursuit of the carriers offered no hope for the swift decisive victory the SHO plan called for. At the same time he could not enter the Leyte Gulf to attack the beachhead as long as the carriers were nearby. And even if he had...
3. The amphibious landing was never in danger.
"MacArthur's Navy" was a well-oiled machine when it came to landing operations. By the time the IJN made its appearance, 130,000 men were ashore with enough supplies to last month. Nearly all of the transports and landing craft had left the gulf. Had Kurita entered the gulf unopposed, he could not have done more than delay the American advance by a day or two. The only opportunity he "missed" was the chance to sacrifice thousands of men to preserve the "sacred honor" of the admirals who had remained in Tokyo.