Monday, December 14, 2020

Why bureaucracies fail (II): Can experts admit to mistakes?


Part I is here

Gen. George Marshall did not create his system on a whim. His decisions were grounded in his deep study of US history. He understood that the US oscillated between long periods of peacetime complacency and sudden bursts of belligerency. When it went to war, its forces were poorly trained, ill-equipped, and badly led. The early days of the war usually brought demoralizing defeats*. The critical need was to find commanders who could adapt and recover – realistic optimists who could rally citizen-soldiers and convey a sense of confidence and urgency.

*Note, however, that blame for these defeats did not rest solely with the army. Civilian leaders had to bear some of the blame for meager peacetime budgets. More importantly, the enemy could usually be blamed for forcing a peace-loving America into an unwanted conflict.

The system worked in WWII and in Korea. Both wars followed the American tradition of unpreparedness -- defeat – recovery. After JFK took office, however, everything changed. The peacetime Army was not starved for funds in peacetime; it was well-equipped with world-class weapons.

Overall, this was all to the good. It did mean, though, that most of the blame for failure would fall on the army and its leadership.

Relieving a commander in the middle of a war raises all sorts of dangerous questions. Why had he been promoted? Why was he selected for a post where the cost of his failures was measured in American blood?

The problem goes beyond optics and and public relations.

The bedrock belief of any bureaucracy is that the organization is the possessor of unique expertise and special competence. To recognize the need to replace a commander calls that expertise and competence into question. Such a general, after all, “had risen through a demanding process over two decades.” He had been vetted, promoted, and selected by the top leadership. Hence:

To say he was not fit for a position was tantamount to a rejection of the process that had produced him.
Tom Ricks The Generals
It is a constant temptation to find explanations for failure that do not raise questions about the systems and the leaders of the organization.

A great deal of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the need for illusion is deep.
Saul Bellow

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