HUMINT

This post over at Asymmetrical Information had me gritting my teeth.

Other related parts of the report indicate that we had no HUMINT sources whatsoever after 1998.

For all the scary language in the Bush and Clinton administrations about Iraq's potential for joining WMDs and terrorism, the CIA doesn't appear to have been doing bugger-all about it other than watch from the sky and repeat what UN inspectors and Iraqi-exiles say.

This is a black mark on both administrations. I guess September 11 did change everything. It is just terrifying how unserious we were.

HUMINT is such a soft term for what Mindles thinks the CIA should have done in Iraq pre-2003. But let's think about what it entails.

First, we have to slip American citizens (CIA officers) into Iraq in a manner that lets them move around Baghdad without arousing suspicion. We have to do that knowing that if they are caught they face torture and death.

These officers then have to ascertain: 1) which high-ranking officials have knowledge of the WMD programs and the contacts with various terrorist groups, and, 2) which of these highly placed Baathists are so disaffected that they are ripe for recruitment as spies.

#1 presents a chicken and egg problem. How do you find out about secret operations (like WMDs) before you know who to talk to? How do you know who to talk to before you know the outline of the secret operation?

Given the risks and Saddam's frequent purges, the population of group #2 is small; it may be equal to zero. No amount of wishing can create a traitor where none exists.

Even if a source is found, the analysts in Langley still have to worry that his revelations are actually disinformation.

The bottom line-- HUMINT is often the best intelligence, but it is not something you can just order up like a decaf latte.