Intelligence Failure? (IV)

Part I is here.

The degree to which the FBI/CIA failed prior to 9-11 is inextricably tied to the question of how sophisticated and robust the al Qaeda conspiracy was. If we think they were simpletons, then almost any action by the US would have permanently derailed the plot. However, if they were smart operatives, then law enforcement's ability to prevent some catastrophic attack at some point was limited.

This matter is at the heart of the statement by Fred Fielding (quoted over at The Truth Laid Bear).

FIELDING: I am sure it's no surprise to you or anybody here that there's a lot of interest in today's hearings and there's a lot of interest simply because on September 11th we were totally beaten. We were beaten and all our systems failed.

Our systems to stop hijackings failed. Our intelligence, domestic and foreign apparatus failed. We had 19 people who were able to -- some of whom were known by the CIA to be terrorists -- entered our country, got visas, were living under their own names in this country, took flight lessons. They beat the security screening with knives to get into the aircraft and turn four aircraft into missiles.

And they had to have -- it was interesting -- they had to have 100 percent success in order to do this and they did.

Notice, though, that Fielding is assuming that the plot would have been easy to derail ("they had to have 100 percent success"). That is simply not borne out by the facts.

The original plot to hijack planes and fly them into buildings was disrupted when the police in Manila arrested one of the conspirators and forced the other two to flee. By the end of 1996 all three were in US custody (including Ramzi Yusef).

One of the first pilots for the reconstituted plot (Ramzi Binalshibh) WAS denied entry into the US. Al Qaeda found other volunteers. When Moussaoui was arrested, the plot continued.

Clearly, AQ did not need 100% success from end to end. They simply needed to keep trying, and get a short string of successes at some point. Fielding understates the real problems we faced in 2001 by minimizing the tenacity of the terrorists.

Similarly, do we know for sure that Atta's original plan called for four and only four planes? For all we know, our actions might have forced them to scale back their plan. That's the problem with intelligence, the murkiness is so deep, nearly every statement of fact can be questioned five different ways.