This won't be Stalingrad

Or Hue, or Mogadishu.......

Reporters and commentators like to grab at analogies. The problems is that too often they do not have an in-depth understanding of the situation in front of them or the historical analogue they cite. So they end up trading in cliches rather than offering a comparative case-study.

Stalingrad was the end of the German advance in WWII and one of the key turning points to the war. But here are a few of the critical factors in the German defeat. Note that none of them apply to the Allies in Baghdad.

The Russian winter.

The Germans were surrounded and cut-off from resupply.

The Russians had superior numbers and superior technology (the T-34 tank, for example, could outslug almost anything the Germans had in 1942).

Time was on the Russian's side They were out-producing the German's in war munitions and their supply lines were shorter. They also had more manpower. Each day the noose got tighter around the German's surrounded in Stalingrad.

Similarly, Hue, happened after three years of optimistic reports on the war's progress. The psychological shock on the home front grew out of the surprise, not battle itself. The Marines were never close to defeat.

Shock was also a factor in Mogadishu--Americans saw horrible pictures from a place they associated with a simple humanitarian mission.

Tactically, Mogadishu was a failed attempt to pull a fast raid which then required an improvised response. We took unexpected casualties. But it was not a debacle. The Ranger and Delta teams fought their way out and inflicted disproportionate losses on the Somali militias. Washington chose to pull our forces out of Mogadishu for political reasons, we were not driven out.

Points on Baghdad

Baghdad has "totalitarian boulevards"-- broad streets unsuitable for a guerrilla warfare. These will allow Allied forces to isolate a few sections of the city at a time and neutralize them.

Normally, city fighting is hard because the attacker must move in a 3-D battle field. Multi-floor buildings and sewers mean defenders can be above or below as well as in front, behind or beside the advancing units. The defender's key challenge is maintaining unit cohesion since the walls prevent men from seeing that neighboring units are still covering their flanks.


In Baghdad, the defense still has that problem of cohesion. They have the additional problem of moving reserves to meet the attacker: our air superiority and surveillance capabilities allow us to identify and attack those reserves. Our mobility also stretches his defensive perimeter.

A key question: Does our air dominance-- from UAVs to B-52s-- stretch the 3-D battlefield to the serious disadvantage of the Iraqi units.

Another key question: how will the population react when the goons are deployed in thin pockets and it becomes clear that they cannot get back-up to them when they are in trouble?

When we get close, we will be able to better monitor and disrupt Saddam's command and control. There are things that can be done on the ground that can't be done from the air.

Given the high skill and courage of our special forces, I wonder if the tunnel system Saddam built under the city will turn out to be a problem rather than an advantage for him.