Saddam's End Game: Just Questions, No Answers

Does he expect to repeat Stalingrad?

1. The Germans were the ones who were encircled. In Iraq, that role will be played by the Republican Guard. Critical difference.

2. Can the RG maintain discipline in an urban environment? Desertion is much easier in a city of 5 million than in the desert. Plus there is the temptation of looting.

3. It seems that the RG divisions are still outside of Baghdad. Can they move men, machines, and munitions into the city without being chopped up by our airpower. They will be very easy to see on the move and extremely vulnerable.


Does he expect to repeat the Miracle of the Marne? That is, to let our lines of communications get extended, then launch a counter-attack that results in a serious defeat for us and changes the whole complexion of the war.

1. Our command and control are light-years ahead of the Germans in 1914. A decisive counter-stroke is hard to imagine.

2. Airpower will hammer any forces that mass to attack. Our superior mobility should enable us to respond and annihilate any such attack.

Does he expect to repeat Tet '68 with Baghdad as Hue? A military defeat which translates into a political victory due to the high casualties and slow progress.

1. It is hard to imagine how Saddam can hold on long enough for the Allies to give up.

2. Does he expect diplomatic pressure on his behalf that will permit him to stay in power?

Is this Berlin '45-- no realistic chance of victory, just a desire for a fiery Gotterdammerung?