Red/Blue Redux
I see that everyone who is anyone is blogging about Sasha Issenberg's "refutation" of David Brooks's "One Nation, Slightly Divisible".
It seems a lot like breaking two butterflies on the wheel. It's hard to believe that anyone takes Brooks's heavily embellished stereotypes as serious reporting. Issenberg finds it easy to demolish some of his factual assertions, yet at other times s/he handles the data clumsily. (E.g. statewide data does not necessarily tell us anything about a specific county.) Neither reporter did a very good job of reporting when it came to the big question-- how different are red and blue America?
As an aside-- it would be interesting if a magazine like The Atlantic did a reverse Brooks. Send a "Red America writer" to do a red/blue comparison.
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
Monday, March 29, 2004
Military Schools and Business Education
Michael Howard has suggested that the military profession is not only physically demanding, but is also the most intellectually demanding:
We must remember as well, that war does not just test the knowledge of generals. On the individual level it tests character as well. Equally important is the premium war places on how well officers work together. Modern military studies have emphasized the importance of tempo during combat operations. The German victories in 1940 owed everything to their ability to read, rethink, and readjust faster than the French. This same factor helps to account for the overwhelming nature of the US victories in Iraq.
The military education system is designed with these challenges in mind. That makes it an interesting subject in its own right. But, here i want to compare it to corporate education. Some of the salient points:
1. There is a lot of it. The generals we see on TV have been to civilian graduate schools, specialized branch schools, and the Army War College. These are full-time positions where officers attend classes for months or even a full year.
This is in stark contrast to corporate life where executive education is heavily front-loaded. Usually the average manager has completed 75% or more of their formal business education before they join the corporation.
2. Key parts of the military's system are in-house; they shape the curriculum, especially at the highest levels.
Corporate education is usually outsourced and generic. The MBA and other executive education programs are usually offered by colleges. In-house, customized programs are most often seen at lower-level training programs for the rank-and-file.
3. Performance at military schools is a factor in promotion decisions. Both Eisenhower and Marshall finished first in their class at Leavenworth which helped marked them for eventual high command. Patton, Bradley, and Mark Clark all had outstanding records at mid-career schools.
Academic performance counts at the entry-level in corporations. But usually only there. Few mid-career executives find themselves in classes where they are graded and where the grades count toward promotion.
4. Military school faculties include officers who are marked for high command. Adm. Raymond Spruance, the victory at Midway, served two tours at the Naval War College in the 1930s. In the two years prior to Pearl Harbor, two of the nine men who would command US field armies were teaching at the Army War College. This is after the war in Europe had started and during an immense expansion of the US military.
Again, this is a key difference from the typical business model. High flyers do not spend a year or two in the training department as a step toward the CEO post.
5. The military school system is not just a means of pushing information and procedures down into the ranks. They also serve as centers for the creation of intellectual capital. In the 1930s the Naval War College helped create and refine the carrier doctrine the USN used in the Pacific War. In the 1980s, John Lehman created Strategic Studies Groups at the NWC. As he described them, "This elite group of midgrade officers, navy and marine, is selected from the fleet to spend a year working on strategy. Each year a new SSG is formed, and changing perspectives help to keep the strategy from solidifying into dogma."
****
There is no corporation that invests as heavily in education as do the armed services. For all the talk about the importance of intellectual capital, the private sector, as a whole, approaches education it in a haphazard fashion and spends comparatively little. At the same time, it is telling that the large corporation which is famous for its education system--GE-- is also one of the most successful big companies in history.
It is also telling that one of the last strategic reassessments of the Welch era-- the rejection of the "#1 or #2 in every market" requirement-- had its genesis in a remark made by a colonel at the Army War College.
UPDATE: James Joyner comments here.
See Part II here.
Michael Howard has suggested that the military profession is not only physically demanding, but is also the most intellectually demanding:
There are two great difficulties with which the professional soldier, sailor or airman has to contend in equipping himself as a commander. First, his profession is almost unique in that he may have to exercise it only once in a lifetime, if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon had to practise throughout his life on dummies for one real operation; or a barrister appeared only once or twice in court towards the close of his career; or a professional swimmer had to spend his life practising on dry land for an Olympic championship on which the fortunes of his entire nation depended. Second, the complex problem of running an army at all is liable to occupy hi mind and skill so completely that it is very easy to forget what it is being run for. The difficulties encountered in the administration, discipline, maintenance and supply of an organization the size of a fair-sized town are enough to occupy the senior officer to the exclusion of any thinking about his real business: the conduct of war. It is not surprising that there has often been a high proportion of failures among senior commanders at the beginning of any war. These unfortunate men may take too long to adjust themselves to reality, through lack of hard preliminary thinking about what war would really be like, or they may have had their minds so far shaped by a lifetime of pure administration that they have ceased to for all practical purposes to be soldiers.
Michael Howard, "The Uses and Abuses of Military History," 1962
We must remember as well, that war does not just test the knowledge of generals. On the individual level it tests character as well. Equally important is the premium war places on how well officers work together. Modern military studies have emphasized the importance of tempo during combat operations. The German victories in 1940 owed everything to their ability to read, rethink, and readjust faster than the French. This same factor helps to account for the overwhelming nature of the US victories in Iraq.
The military education system is designed with these challenges in mind. That makes it an interesting subject in its own right. But, here i want to compare it to corporate education. Some of the salient points:
1. There is a lot of it. The generals we see on TV have been to civilian graduate schools, specialized branch schools, and the Army War College. These are full-time positions where officers attend classes for months or even a full year.
This is in stark contrast to corporate life where executive education is heavily front-loaded. Usually the average manager has completed 75% or more of their formal business education before they join the corporation.
2. Key parts of the military's system are in-house; they shape the curriculum, especially at the highest levels.
Corporate education is usually outsourced and generic. The MBA and other executive education programs are usually offered by colleges. In-house, customized programs are most often seen at lower-level training programs for the rank-and-file.
3. Performance at military schools is a factor in promotion decisions. Both Eisenhower and Marshall finished first in their class at Leavenworth which helped marked them for eventual high command. Patton, Bradley, and Mark Clark all had outstanding records at mid-career schools.
Academic performance counts at the entry-level in corporations. But usually only there. Few mid-career executives find themselves in classes where they are graded and where the grades count toward promotion.
4. Military school faculties include officers who are marked for high command. Adm. Raymond Spruance, the victory at Midway, served two tours at the Naval War College in the 1930s. In the two years prior to Pearl Harbor, two of the nine men who would command US field armies were teaching at the Army War College. This is after the war in Europe had started and during an immense expansion of the US military.
Again, this is a key difference from the typical business model. High flyers do not spend a year or two in the training department as a step toward the CEO post.
5. The military school system is not just a means of pushing information and procedures down into the ranks. They also serve as centers for the creation of intellectual capital. In the 1930s the Naval War College helped create and refine the carrier doctrine the USN used in the Pacific War. In the 1980s, John Lehman created Strategic Studies Groups at the NWC. As he described them, "This elite group of midgrade officers, navy and marine, is selected from the fleet to spend a year working on strategy. Each year a new SSG is formed, and changing perspectives help to keep the strategy from solidifying into dogma."
****
There is no corporation that invests as heavily in education as do the armed services. For all the talk about the importance of intellectual capital, the private sector, as a whole, approaches education it in a haphazard fashion and spends comparatively little. At the same time, it is telling that the large corporation which is famous for its education system--GE-- is also one of the most successful big companies in history.
It is also telling that one of the last strategic reassessments of the Welch era-- the rejection of the "#1 or #2 in every market" requirement-- had its genesis in a remark made by a colonel at the Army War College.
UPDATE: James Joyner comments here.
See Part II here.
Corporate Blogging
This article from Fast Company takes a look at how some companies are using blogs internally.
At Verizon, Paul Perry, a director in the company's eServices division, started a blog to keep up with news about competitors. Using a news aggregator, a popular blog-world tool that grabs and assembles syndicated "feeds" of content from Web sites and other blogs, people in his group can quickly post news they find on those feeds to the internal blog. DaimlerChrysler employs Web log software at a few of its U.S. plants; managers discuss problems and keep a record of their solutions. And American Airlines, where only 20% of the company's highly mobile workforce has corporate email, is considering blogs as a way to give employees more channels to management.
The Hartford Financial Services Group is already finding success using blogs in one of its mobile groups. A team of 40 field technology managers, who serve as links between The Hartford's network of insurance agents and the home office, set up a blog in August. They use it to share information about e-commerce features and solutions to technology problems. Before, email and voice mail sufficed, but email threads would die, and there was no way to search past shared information. "We don't get a chance to talk with each other as often as we'd like," says Steve Grebner, one of The Hartford's field managers, who thinks of the blog a little like a town square. "To me, it's like there's 14--or 40--brains out there, and you might as well tap into that knowledge base."
See also, this from last year.
This article from Fast Company takes a look at how some companies are using blogs internally.
At Verizon, Paul Perry, a director in the company's eServices division, started a blog to keep up with news about competitors. Using a news aggregator, a popular blog-world tool that grabs and assembles syndicated "feeds" of content from Web sites and other blogs, people in his group can quickly post news they find on those feeds to the internal blog. DaimlerChrysler employs Web log software at a few of its U.S. plants; managers discuss problems and keep a record of their solutions. And American Airlines, where only 20% of the company's highly mobile workforce has corporate email, is considering blogs as a way to give employees more channels to management.
The Hartford Financial Services Group is already finding success using blogs in one of its mobile groups. A team of 40 field technology managers, who serve as links between The Hartford's network of insurance agents and the home office, set up a blog in August. They use it to share information about e-commerce features and solutions to technology problems. Before, email and voice mail sufficed, but email threads would die, and there was no way to search past shared information. "We don't get a chance to talk with each other as often as we'd like," says Steve Grebner, one of The Hartford's field managers, who thinks of the blog a little like a town square. "To me, it's like there's 14--or 40--brains out there, and you might as well tap into that knowledge base."
See also, this from last year.
Sunday, March 28, 2004
Maybe the Frontier Did Matter
If you think about it, the 2004 election shows that the United States is an oligarchy with a closed political system that offers only a narrow range of choices. Consider-- John Kerry and George Bush are both sons of prominent and wealthy New England families. Both attended Yale. Both are members of the same elite secret society (Skull and Bones).
Yet, for all of that, they seem to be two very different sorts of men. In part, this is a tribute to the infinite variety of the human beast. But if i had to get more specific i'd summarize the difference in one word-- Texas.
Those things that make Bush the anti-Kerry-- from his religiosity to his democratic manner-- come from west Texas, not Boston or New Haven.
For a over a century the Northeast has been caught between powerful gravitational fields. Across the Atlantic was Europe-- refined, intellectual, exquisite Europe. To the west lay, well, the West-- crude, boisterous, and democratic.
During the primary campaign this was thrown into stark relief. Kerry, Dean, et. al. condemned Bush as an out of control cowboy who alienated Europe. Cowboy bad, France good. They thought this was a powerful critique.
Rich, Harvard-educated Theodore Roosevelt went west to the Dakotas as a young, dandified widower. After a stint as a cowboy, lawman, and hunter, he returned to New York as the embryonic TR. It was TR who became a war hero, a beloved president, and finally, a mythic, towering figure. His biographers agree that his later political career would have been impossible but for his time out West.
Henry James took the opposite path. He left America behind to live in England.
Edmund Morris notes that James's "preference for English society and English literature drove Roosevelt to near frenzy." TR considered James a "miserable little snob." He wrote with disdain of "the undersized man of letters, who flees his country because he, with his delicate, effeminate sensitiveness, finds the conditions of life on this side of the water crude and raw."
James, for his part, judged Roosevelt "the mere monstrous embodiment of unprecedented and resounding Noise" and "a dangerous and ominous jingo."
John Kerry had no need to become an expatriate. Over the last century Massachusetts has become very congenial for the sensitive and exquisite. But there is still that patrician disdain for how we do things out here in fly-over country (still so crude and raw). Most of all, there is that craving for European modes and European approval.
If you think about it, the 2004 election shows that the United States is an oligarchy with a closed political system that offers only a narrow range of choices. Consider-- John Kerry and George Bush are both sons of prominent and wealthy New England families. Both attended Yale. Both are members of the same elite secret society (Skull and Bones).
Yet, for all of that, they seem to be two very different sorts of men. In part, this is a tribute to the infinite variety of the human beast. But if i had to get more specific i'd summarize the difference in one word-- Texas.
Those things that make Bush the anti-Kerry-- from his religiosity to his democratic manner-- come from west Texas, not Boston or New Haven.
For a over a century the Northeast has been caught between powerful gravitational fields. Across the Atlantic was Europe-- refined, intellectual, exquisite Europe. To the west lay, well, the West-- crude, boisterous, and democratic.
During the primary campaign this was thrown into stark relief. Kerry, Dean, et. al. condemned Bush as an out of control cowboy who alienated Europe. Cowboy bad, France good. They thought this was a powerful critique.
Rich, Harvard-educated Theodore Roosevelt went west to the Dakotas as a young, dandified widower. After a stint as a cowboy, lawman, and hunter, he returned to New York as the embryonic TR. It was TR who became a war hero, a beloved president, and finally, a mythic, towering figure. His biographers agree that his later political career would have been impossible but for his time out West.
Henry James took the opposite path. He left America behind to live in England.
Edmund Morris notes that James's "preference for English society and English literature drove Roosevelt to near frenzy." TR considered James a "miserable little snob." He wrote with disdain of "the undersized man of letters, who flees his country because he, with his delicate, effeminate sensitiveness, finds the conditions of life on this side of the water crude and raw."
James, for his part, judged Roosevelt "the mere monstrous embodiment of unprecedented and resounding Noise" and "a dangerous and ominous jingo."
John Kerry had no need to become an expatriate. Over the last century Massachusetts has become very congenial for the sensitive and exquisite. But there is still that patrician disdain for how we do things out here in fly-over country (still so crude and raw). Most of all, there is that craving for European modes and European approval.
Saturday, March 27, 2004
The BBQ Test
During the 1952 election, political reporters Stewart and Joseph Alsop hit upon a key test for predicting presidential elections: Which candidate would voters prefer to have over to their house for a cook-out?
By this measure, how can Bush lose? It's easy to picture GWB eating a burger and playing catch with the kids. But Kerry? You almost expect him to ask for a knife and fork to eat his drumstick.
And let's not even discuss how the wives would fare.
During the 1952 election, political reporters Stewart and Joseph Alsop hit upon a key test for predicting presidential elections: Which candidate would voters prefer to have over to their house for a cook-out?
By this measure, how can Bush lose? It's easy to picture GWB eating a burger and playing catch with the kids. But Kerry? You almost expect him to ask for a knife and fork to eat his drumstick.
And let's not even discuss how the wives would fare.
Friday, March 26, 2004
The A-List
This is one of the best books i've ever read on business strategy and corporate planning. Maybe the best.
I'd say more but i wrote a review of it for Strategy and Leadership. I'll wait until that appears and then link to it.
This is one of the best books i've ever read on business strategy and corporate planning. Maybe the best.
I'd say more but i wrote a review of it for Strategy and Leadership. I'll wait until that appears and then link to it.
They're Just Thugs
Jeff Soyer watches The Sopranos on DVD. He is not amused.
Yes, it's a great show to follow. Great acting, plots, etc. But... But, but, but, but, folks, these Mafia dudes, organized crime types, whatever you want to call them, are terrible people. Yeah, you can feel for Tony but in the end, they are nothing but thugs.
I have to agree. It may be good television, but it really goes to a lot of work in order to make the ugly more admirable.
UPDATE: Scott Chaffin weighs in here.
Jeff Soyer watches The Sopranos on DVD. He is not amused.
Yes, it's a great show to follow. Great acting, plots, etc. But... But, but, but, but, folks, these Mafia dudes, organized crime types, whatever you want to call them, are terrible people. Yeah, you can feel for Tony but in the end, they are nothing but thugs.
I have to agree. It may be good television, but it really goes to a lot of work in order to make the ugly more admirable.
UPDATE: Scott Chaffin weighs in here.
Thursday, March 25, 2004
Historical Footnote
I ran across a table that summarized US naval losses in WWII. What struck me was that the US lost only two battleships in the course of the war, compared to four fleet carriers and one light carrier. Both of the battleships lost were sunk in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. All of the carriers were sunk during combat operations when they were at full alert and prepared.
The image of the battlewagon as a pathetically vulnerable dinosaur really is based on the losses of four ships in the first month of the Allied-Japanese War. In addition to the American losses at Pearl, Britain lost the Prince of Wales and the Repulse when Japanese plains attacked them during the Malay/Singapore operation. After that, Allied battlewagons held up very well.
Part of that is due to the fact that carriers became the prime target during air attacks and the BBs were not subject to the same risks. However, the battleships did fight surface actions in the Solomons and Philippines and were remarkably resilience. We also have to recognize that it proved astonishingly difficult for US planes to sink Japanese battleships: it took 10 torpedoes and 6 bombs to sink the Yamato.
I ran across a table that summarized US naval losses in WWII. What struck me was that the US lost only two battleships in the course of the war, compared to four fleet carriers and one light carrier. Both of the battleships lost were sunk in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. All of the carriers were sunk during combat operations when they were at full alert and prepared.
The image of the battlewagon as a pathetically vulnerable dinosaur really is based on the losses of four ships in the first month of the Allied-Japanese War. In addition to the American losses at Pearl, Britain lost the Prince of Wales and the Repulse when Japanese plains attacked them during the Malay/Singapore operation. After that, Allied battlewagons held up very well.
Part of that is due to the fact that carriers became the prime target during air attacks and the BBs were not subject to the same risks. However, the battleships did fight surface actions in the Solomons and Philippines and were remarkably resilience. We also have to recognize that it proved astonishingly difficult for US planes to sink Japanese battleships: it took 10 torpedoes and 6 bombs to sink the Yamato.
Monday, March 22, 2004
Zero Defects and Branding Services
Frozen North (permlink not working, look for 18 March) discusses the role of quality in the marketing of services. He is quite right to emphasize that the customer service experience is a critical component of the brand image and that service firms err if they ignore it in favor of advertising and PR.
The long-term problem is that CS quality isn't a sustainable point of differentiation. Your competitors can copy your zero-defect call center. At that point, bad service hurts your brand, but good service doesn't help: customers perceive it as par for the course.
Good service, then, is a necessary, but not sufficient factor in branding success. The firm needs something else to claim a premium position. Strategic management requires that leadership keep its eye on two goals at once: the short-term objective of zero defects and the long-term goal of being distinctive in a way that is meaningful to customers. It is a mistake to believe that the latter will flow automatically from the former.
Frozen North (permlink not working, look for 18 March) discusses the role of quality in the marketing of services. He is quite right to emphasize that the customer service experience is a critical component of the brand image and that service firms err if they ignore it in favor of advertising and PR.
The long-term problem is that CS quality isn't a sustainable point of differentiation. Your competitors can copy your zero-defect call center. At that point, bad service hurts your brand, but good service doesn't help: customers perceive it as par for the course.
Good service, then, is a necessary, but not sufficient factor in branding success. The firm needs something else to claim a premium position. Strategic management requires that leadership keep its eye on two goals at once: the short-term objective of zero defects and the long-term goal of being distinctive in a way that is meaningful to customers. It is a mistake to believe that the latter will flow automatically from the former.
Missouri: It Really is the Heart of It All
The current Atlantic sets out to find the state that comes closest to being a microcosm of the whole US. It turns out that Missouri is a surprisingly good fit based on a host of economic, demographic, political and cultural measures.
It is worth noting that John Ashcroft was a very successful politician in Missouri.
The current Atlantic sets out to find the state that comes closest to being a microcosm of the whole US. It turns out that Missouri is a surprisingly good fit based on a host of economic, demographic, political and cultural measures.
It is worth noting that John Ashcroft was a very successful politician in Missouri.
Carnival of the Capitalists: March 22, 2004
The latest edition of the best biz/econ blogging is here.
The latest edition of the best biz/econ blogging is here.
Sunday, March 21, 2004
Still Neo, I Guess: The Case for War One Year Later
I started blogging a year ago, just before the invasion of Iraq. One of my first posts laid out what i saw as the case for the war. Looking at it today, i believe that the case remains surprisingly solid.
(I claim no special insight or brilliance on this matter: my post was just one non-warblogger's assessment of the arguments being made in 2002-3003.)
Several points stand out. The case for war did not argue that Saddam's WMDs were an "imminent threat" or that he was involved in the 9-11 attacks. Instead, it argued that he was trying to get WMDs, that containment/sanctions/deterrence were beset with problems of their own, and that waiting was worse than acting. Nothing i've read in the past year refutes that assessment.
Nor has the Iraq war brought the war against al Qaeda to a halt as some claimed it would. We are still rolling up cells and neutralizing their leadership.
The evidence that has come to light since the fall of Saddam bolsters the claim that the UN and France had corrupt motives for opposing the war.
I have to admit that i am surprised that we have not found evidence of WMDs. The intelligence failure is a legitimate cause for concern.
Although i did not include it, i had hoped that a decisive military victory would provide geopolitical leverage against other outlaw regimes. I don't believe that this has been borne out. Certainly Libya's conciliatory moves have been a positive. But that has to be balanced against the difficulties of the occupation and the failure to kill or capture Saddam in the early days of the war.
I started blogging a year ago, just before the invasion of Iraq. One of my first posts laid out what i saw as the case for the war. Looking at it today, i believe that the case remains surprisingly solid.
(I claim no special insight or brilliance on this matter: my post was just one non-warblogger's assessment of the arguments being made in 2002-3003.)
Several points stand out. The case for war did not argue that Saddam's WMDs were an "imminent threat" or that he was involved in the 9-11 attacks. Instead, it argued that he was trying to get WMDs, that containment/sanctions/deterrence were beset with problems of their own, and that waiting was worse than acting. Nothing i've read in the past year refutes that assessment.
Nor has the Iraq war brought the war against al Qaeda to a halt as some claimed it would. We are still rolling up cells and neutralizing their leadership.
The evidence that has come to light since the fall of Saddam bolsters the claim that the UN and France had corrupt motives for opposing the war.
I have to admit that i am surprised that we have not found evidence of WMDs. The intelligence failure is a legitimate cause for concern.
Although i did not include it, i had hoped that a decisive military victory would provide geopolitical leverage against other outlaw regimes. I don't believe that this has been borne out. Certainly Libya's conciliatory moves have been a positive. But that has to be balanced against the difficulties of the occupation and the failure to kill or capture Saddam in the early days of the war.
Friday, March 19, 2004
"Iraq: Intelligence, Facts, and Fantasies"
Here is a recent speech by one of the best US Senators. Kyl isn't one of those guys who show up on cable shows four times a week. And he is not much of a screamer and shouter. He's just a thoughtful, serious senator.
Senator Kennedy began his presentation by calling on CIA Director George Tenet to use his upcoming testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee to state whether "he feels that the White House altered the facts, or misused the intelligence." If Director Tenet believed that, Senator Kennedy said, then Tenet "should say so, and say it plainly." As we all know now, Senator Kennedy on Tuesday asked Director Tenet whether he believed the administration had misrepresented the facts to justify the war. Tenet answered: "No, sir, I don't."
Here is a recent speech by one of the best US Senators. Kyl isn't one of those guys who show up on cable shows four times a week. And he is not much of a screamer and shouter. He's just a thoughtful, serious senator.
Senator Kennedy began his presentation by calling on CIA Director George Tenet to use his upcoming testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee to state whether "he feels that the White House altered the facts, or misused the intelligence." If Director Tenet believed that, Senator Kennedy said, then Tenet "should say so, and say it plainly." As we all know now, Senator Kennedy on Tuesday asked Director Tenet whether he believed the administration had misrepresented the facts to justify the war. Tenet answered: "No, sir, I don't."
Thursday, March 18, 2004
Words Almost Fail Me
Here is a writer on a German website worrying that the Passion will increase anti-Semitism
Opinion: The Crux of Gibson's Crucifixion
Not in Germany, you know, but among those lesser peoples to the East
Christian anti-Semitism is far from being surmounted in Eastern Europe in particular. In parts of Poland and Hungary, for example, the hate of Jews as "murderers of God" is still quite alive.
Here is a writer on a German website worrying that the Passion will increase anti-Semitism
Opinion: The Crux of Gibson's Crucifixion
Not in Germany, you know, but among those lesser peoples to the East
Christian anti-Semitism is far from being surmounted in Eastern Europe in particular. In parts of Poland and Hungary, for example, the hate of Jews as "murderers of God" is still quite alive.
Many ways to play this game
Jane Galt asks:
Did the Spanish elections incentivize terror?
Is it also fair to ask if loudly asserting that al Qaeda won in Spain encourages them to bomb other allies?
Jane Galt asks:
Did the Spanish elections incentivize terror?
Is it also fair to ask if loudly asserting that al Qaeda won in Spain encourages them to bomb other allies?
Wednesday, March 17, 2004
More Spain
Justin Katz takes me to task for my post on Spain, democracy, and warbloggers. He is always worth reading so check out his post.
My disgust with the reactions i cited is rooted in the quick condemnation aimed at the Spanish electorate by people who know almost nothing about what happened. Maybe Spain wants to capitulate to bin Laden, maybe they don't. All we do know, today, is that the new Spanish government wants out of Iraq. That alone is not conclusive evidence of appeasement. (Maybe they believe that Iraq is now the wrong war at the wrong time to quote a famous American general who was also derided as an appeaser).
If Spain refuses to share intelligence on al Qaeda with the US or if they allow terrorist groups to set-up camp in Madrid, then they deserve to be condemned as cowards and opportunists. But where is the evidence they intend to do anything of the sort?
Great Britain and the US are allies. That relationship survives no matter what party is in power. The Atlantic alliance was not broken when Tony Blair defeated John Major. It survived the election of a Republican in 2000. Allies have a shared interest which transcends domestic politics.
Empires, in contrast, take sides in the domestic elections of their satellites. They care about internal matters. Too many warbloggers betray a deep-seated imperial impulse. (I don't mean Justin, but those like Simon, Jarvis, Sullivan, and their commentators). They demand a rigid ideological conformity from our partners in the war against terror.
Today they praise Poland as a brave and steadfast ally. A week from now they could just as easily condemn it as a nation of anti-Semitic religious fanatics and collaborators in the Holocaust. All it will take is a headline in the New York Times to set them off. The idea of not spouting off never occurs to them.
See also this post at Dean' blog.
Justin Katz takes me to task for my post on Spain, democracy, and warbloggers. He is always worth reading so check out his post.
My disgust with the reactions i cited is rooted in the quick condemnation aimed at the Spanish electorate by people who know almost nothing about what happened. Maybe Spain wants to capitulate to bin Laden, maybe they don't. All we do know, today, is that the new Spanish government wants out of Iraq. That alone is not conclusive evidence of appeasement. (Maybe they believe that Iraq is now the wrong war at the wrong time to quote a famous American general who was also derided as an appeaser).
If Spain refuses to share intelligence on al Qaeda with the US or if they allow terrorist groups to set-up camp in Madrid, then they deserve to be condemned as cowards and opportunists. But where is the evidence they intend to do anything of the sort?
Great Britain and the US are allies. That relationship survives no matter what party is in power. The Atlantic alliance was not broken when Tony Blair defeated John Major. It survived the election of a Republican in 2000. Allies have a shared interest which transcends domestic politics.
Empires, in contrast, take sides in the domestic elections of their satellites. They care about internal matters. Too many warbloggers betray a deep-seated imperial impulse. (I don't mean Justin, but those like Simon, Jarvis, Sullivan, and their commentators). They demand a rigid ideological conformity from our partners in the war against terror.
Today they praise Poland as a brave and steadfast ally. A week from now they could just as easily condemn it as a nation of anti-Semitic religious fanatics and collaborators in the Holocaust. All it will take is a headline in the New York Times to set them off. The idea of not spouting off never occurs to them.
See also this post at Dean' blog.
Tuesday, March 16, 2004
An Example of the "Youth Premium"
In syndication, "Friends" has an audience of 7.32 million. "Wheel of Fortune" pulls in 13.38 million viewers. Yet a 30 second national spot on Friends costs $221,567 and only $82,950 on "Wheel". Advertisers believe that the average "Friends" watcher is worth almost five times as much as a "Wheel" fan.
Given this large gap, one might suppose that this differential is backed up by reams of data and analysis. But, instead, it rests on little more than the belief that young people are easier to persuade than older people. (Not that anyone has a lot of evidence for that, either.)
In syndication, "Friends" has an audience of 7.32 million. "Wheel of Fortune" pulls in 13.38 million viewers. Yet a 30 second national spot on Friends costs $221,567 and only $82,950 on "Wheel". Advertisers believe that the average "Friends" watcher is worth almost five times as much as a "Wheel" fan.
Given this large gap, one might suppose that this differential is backed up by reams of data and analysis. But, instead, it rests on little more than the belief that young people are easier to persuade than older people. (Not that anyone has a lot of evidence for that, either.)
Spain, or The Ugly American Blogger
I don't know if Spain just capitulated to bin Laden. Interpreting election results is a pretty complex business and instant analysis is just so much hot air.
But that doesn't stop big name bloggers and their commentators. Check out Roger Simon, Jeff Jarvis, the Corner, and the Inkwell.
This reaction is funny in so many ways. I thought warbloggers were in favor of democracy. But it turns out that they only like elections when their side wins. They seem to confuse allies with satellites.
The Spanish voters are cowards because they have deserted the Bush coalition in Iraq. Yet, Jeff Jarvis has been looking for an excuse to jump off the Bush bandwagon here at home because the FCC is being mean to Howard Stern. That, apparently, is a matter of principle not a failure of courage.
In October 2000 Al Qaeda attacked the US Cole. A few weeks, the Democrats lost the White House. Did we "capitulate" to terrorism by electing Bush?
FWIW, i'm puzzled by the former Spanish PM's insistence on blaming ETA for the Madrid atrocity when the evidence pointed Islamic terrorists. Maybe he was playing a little politics with the attack and got burned at the ballot box for it.
This post over at Volokh makes a lot more sense than those noted above.
As does this one at the evangelical outpost.
I don't know if Spain just capitulated to bin Laden. Interpreting election results is a pretty complex business and instant analysis is just so much hot air.
But that doesn't stop big name bloggers and their commentators. Check out Roger Simon, Jeff Jarvis, the Corner, and the Inkwell.
This reaction is funny in so many ways. I thought warbloggers were in favor of democracy. But it turns out that they only like elections when their side wins. They seem to confuse allies with satellites.
The Spanish voters are cowards because they have deserted the Bush coalition in Iraq. Yet, Jeff Jarvis has been looking for an excuse to jump off the Bush bandwagon here at home because the FCC is being mean to Howard Stern. That, apparently, is a matter of principle not a failure of courage.
In October 2000 Al Qaeda attacked the US Cole. A few weeks, the Democrats lost the White House. Did we "capitulate" to terrorism by electing Bush?
FWIW, i'm puzzled by the former Spanish PM's insistence on blaming ETA for the Madrid atrocity when the evidence pointed Islamic terrorists. Maybe he was playing a little politics with the attack and got burned at the ballot box for it.
This post over at Volokh makes a lot more sense than those noted above.
As does this one at the evangelical outpost.
Monday, March 15, 2004
Forgotten American Terrorism
After WWI, "anarchists"* carried out a number of bombings against American targets. They tried to assassinate the Attorney General in Washington and killed 40-44 people with a lunch time explosion on Wall Street. While not on the scale of the WTC atrocity, they were still large scale in the context of America at that time. (Our population was then only 100 million which makes the Wall Street bombing over half as deadly as Oklahoma City in comparative terms.)
This NY Press story is a good summary of the attack and the unsuccessful investigation which followed.
*The term is something of a misnomer. Many of the revolutionaries were left-wing radicals inspired by Lenin and Trotsky.
After WWI, "anarchists"* carried out a number of bombings against American targets. They tried to assassinate the Attorney General in Washington and killed 40-44 people with a lunch time explosion on Wall Street. While not on the scale of the WTC atrocity, they were still large scale in the context of America at that time. (Our population was then only 100 million which makes the Wall Street bombing over half as deadly as Oklahoma City in comparative terms.)
This NY Press story is a good summary of the attack and the unsuccessful investigation which followed.
*The term is something of a misnomer. Many of the revolutionaries were left-wing radicals inspired by Lenin and Trotsky.
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